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INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with antitrust problems which may confront
a joint venture doing business in the European Economic Community.'
For purposes of this Article, a "joint venture" is defined as a
new business organization, formed by a number of already existing
business enterprises which want to operate as partners for certain
business purposes. The purchase of an equity interest by one
enterprise in an existing business, and financial syndicates are not
included within this definition. The respective proportion of equity
participation by the partners in the joint venture may vary widely.
Moreover, the joint venture may come about as a result of the com-
bination of two or more partners whose existing business activities
may be in a horizontal, vertical, or mixed relationship to each other.
Also, the partners may be located anywhere in the world. This study
will, however, focus on those joint ventures in which at least one
participant is American, since in that situation the joint venture and
the American partner may be subject to the impact of both the United
States and EEC antitrust laws.
Other aspects of the joint venture, including the number of part-
ners, their location, their competitive relationship, the size and nature
of their respective businesses and of the joint venture, are all
factors which, alone or in combination, may be relevant to the issue
of legality under the applicable antitrust laws. It may be determina-
tive whether the partners in the joint venture are actual or potential
competitors with respect to the products or services offered by the
joint venture, or whether the situation presents no such aspects. Like-
wise, it may be very important whether the joint venture is engaged
* This paper was initially submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of
a seminar course on The European Economic Community given by Professor Louis
B. Schwartz and Dr. Eberhard Ginther, President, German Kartellamt, at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School in the Spring Semester, 1962. The writer is
indebted to both Professor Schwartz and Dr. Gfinther for their constructive criticism
and helpful suggestions.
Y B.S. 1950, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B. 1957, Temple University.
Registered United States Patent Attorney; Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
I The European Economic Community will be referred to as the Common Market
or EEC. It was established by the Treaty of Rome for the Establishment of the
European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 14. Translations of
the Treaty of Rome can be found in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 865 (1957), and in CCH
COMMON MARKET REP. Most of the translations of the Treaty and other foreign
materials in this Article are by the author.
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in distribution or manufacturing, or both types of activities, and to
what extent the partners are engaged in similar practices. But because
of the breadth of the subject, these factors will be discussed only
briefly, except where any of them is especially relevant in a particular
context.
Joint ventures, already representing a very substantial proportion
of American business participation in Europe, are becoming an in-
creasingly more common form of new United States investment in
Western Europe.2 It is not the purpose of this Article to discuss the
virtues of the joint venture as a means of operating abroad; the relative
merits of various forms of business in the EEC have been evaluated
elsewhere.3 Once an American enterprise has decided to operate
abroad,4 it may have many reasons for seeking local participation. The
national partner may supplement capital, supply production and dis-
tribution facilities, or facilitate political support. Local participation
may also facilitate the management and exploitation of industrial
property rights, like patents and trademarks.
Although prior studies of the joint venture in Europe are, to
a large extent, still valid, they were written before the establishment
of the Common Market' or before the implementation of the rules
of the Treaty of Rome governing competition,6 at a time when a
rather rhetorical climate prevailed. Now, in the light of recent develop-
ments in this field, the antitrust problems have assumed very practical
significance and a tone of urgency. On March 13, 1962, Regulation
17, implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty- the rules govern-
2 $1,500,000,000 was added to direct United States investments in Europe in 1960.
$300,000,000 of the increase represented cash outlays to acquire minority interests
in existing manufacturing companies. 41 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BusINEss 20, 21 (1961). The available figures do not segregate the contributions
attributable to the formation of joint ventures per se. The Commerce Department
reports that for the two-year period ending in June 1962, about 1,110 different United
States companies initiated 2,197 foreign business ventures. Western Europe was
the site of 51% of the new activity.
3 See Conard, Organizing for Business, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL PROFILE 1 (Stein & Nicholson ed. 1960).
This book also analyzes the legal aspects of doing business in the EEC. For dis-
cussion of the American antitrust implications of doing business abroad as a joint
enterprise, see BREWsTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 200-23
(1958).
4 The economic considerations which attract American business to the Continent
have been extensively discussed. See, e.g., Friedmann, Legal Problems in Foreign
Investments, 14 Bus. LAW. 746 (1959).
5 See Eaton, Joint Ventures, in N.Y.S.B.A. SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, ANTI-
TRUST LAW SYmtosIum 135, 141-44 (1952) ; Graham, Antitrust Problems of Corpo-
rate Patents, Subsidiaries, Affiliates and Joint Ventures in Foreign Commerce,
9 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 32 (1956); Hale, Collaborative Subsidiaries and the
Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REV. 927 (1956).
6 For a recent discussion, see Nebolsine, Antitrust Laws of the Common Market
Countries, 3 SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD AND FOREIGN TRADE 211 (1961).
7 Regulation 17, [19621 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUT-S EUROPPENNES
204 [hereinafter cited as J.O.C.E.], CCH COMION MARKET RF. f12401-2632, as
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ing competition--came into effect. The Regulation subjects certain
agreements which affect trade and competition in the Common Market,
as specified by article 85, section 1, to notification to the EEC Com-
mission. Furthermore, on April 6, 1962, the Court of Justice of the
EEC, in the landmark case of DeGeus v. Robert Bosch GmbH,'
handed down its first decision on the applicability of article 85 and
construed parts of the Regulation. At the threshold of a new era
of EEC antitrust law, this study attempts to make a preliminary
evaluation of the measure to which these antitrust laws are likely to be
obstacles to the joint venture in the EEC. The findings may shed
some light on whether these laws, in purporting to stimulate freer
competition, will also promote, rather than stifle, the further commer-
cial success of the joint venture in the EEC.
This study first examines to what extent joint ventures are sub-
ject to control by the national laws of EEC member states and by the
Treaty of Rome. Consideration is then given to the applicability of
the EEC antitrust provisions to the organic agreements establishing
the joint venture. The joint venture is then studied functionally by
evaluating the legality of some practices in which it, more than other
forms of business corporations, is likely to engage. Finally, the inter-
action of United States and EEC antitrust laws will be briefly dis-
cussed. Throughout the study, a special attempt is made at detecting
features that may be more conducive to the compatibility with, and
therefore, to a more successful operation and management of the joint
venture under, the EEC antitrust laws.
I. THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A JOINT VENTURE
The right of establishing a joint venture by any number of cor-
porate partners, at least some of which have diverse citizenship, is
implemented by Regulation 27, [1962] J.O.C.E. 1118, CCH COmMON MARKET REP.
112651-57, as amended, [1962] J.O.C.E. 1655, CCH COMMON MARKET REP. 1112441,
2461. The filing date has been extended to November 1, 1962, and, for agreements be-
tween only two parties, to February 1, 1963. Regulation 59, [1962] J.O.C.E. 1655, CCH
COMMON MARKET REP. 1 2441. For a detailed analysis of the Regulation, see Weiser,
Freedom of Competition in the European Community: An Analysis of the Regulations
Implementing the Antitrust Provisions, 6 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARcH
& Enuc. 20 (1962). See generally Buxbaum, Antitrust Regulation Within the
European Economic Community, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 402 (1961) ; Deringer, Die erste
Durchfiihrungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 85 und 86 des EWG-Vertrages, 2 WIRT-
SCHAFT UND WEvTBEWERB 81 (1962) ; Deringer, Les Rigles concernant la concurrence
dans le cadre du Marchi Commun entrent cn vigeur, 44 REvUE DU MARCHE COmmUN 70
(1962); Gaspar, Riglementation des enteutes et des positims dominantes dans le
Marchh Commun, Revue de Droit Intellectuel, Jan.-Feb. 1962, pp. 1-8; De Caluw6,
Premier Rkglement d'Application des Articles 85 et 86 du Traiti de Rome, Revue
de Droit Intellectuel, Jan.-Feb. 1962, p. 9.
8Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH,
Court of Justice of the European Communities, April 6, 1962, 8 Recueil de la Juris-
prudence de la Cour No. 13/61, [1962] J.O.C.E. 1081, CCH CommoN MARKET REP.
f 8003.
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based on the laws regulating the right of establishing a corporation in
the EEC.' For the American partner, this right is generally predi-
cated upon the treaties of commerce, friendship and navigation which
grant American companies the right to carry on business in the mem-
ber countries of the EEC."0  Moreover, the right of a company of one
of the EEC countries to establish a business in another EEC country
is being further liberalized by the Treaty of Rome which recognizes
the "Right of Establishment" in articles 52 to 58. Article 52 provides:
[R]estrictions on the freedom of nationals of a Member
State in the territory of another Member State shall
be abolished. . . . Such progressive abolition shall . . .
apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches,
or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established
in the territory of any Member State."
In addition, article 54 for the Council of the EEC proposes a general
program for abolishing the restrictions existing within the Community
on the freedom of establishment before 1963. This provision.is broad
enough to encompass joint ventures where the partners are from mem-
ber countries in the EEC. Where the joint venture is established by
partners comprising American and EEC nationals in an EEC country
other than that of the EEC partner, there would be no obstacle to the
establishment of the venture. The combined effect of the treaties
discussed would insure this freedom of establishment.
The joint venture is also compatible with the policies ex-
pressed in other treaty provisions. Articles 67 to 73 are freeing the
movement of capital within the EEC. The first directives 12 imple-
menting them have introduced greater freedom in the issuance, offer-
ing, sale, and purchase of securities in the capital markets of Europe.
Moreover, on this greater freedom of establishment and of movement
of capital, there can be superimposed the equal treatment clause of
article 221 of the Treaty which requires that: "Member States shall
treat nationals of other Member States in the same manner, as regards
9 See generally Audinet, Le Droit d'Etablisseinent dans la Communautj Eco-
nozniqute Europienne, 86 JOURNAL DU DROIr INTERNATIONAL 982 (1959).
10 The United States has a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593; with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; with
the Netherlands, March 27, 1956, [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
In Belgium and Luxembourg, the right to establish a business has been freely granted
to foreign enterprises. See Nicholson, The Significance of Treaties to the Establish-
nerit of Companies, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNITY-A LEGAL PROFILE 153 (Stein & Nicholson ed. 1960).
11298 U.N.T.S. at 37, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. at 886, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.
1301.
12 [1960] J.O.C.E. 921-23, CCH COMMON MARKET R.En. 1651-67.
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financial participation by such nationals in the capital of companies
within the meaning of Article 58, as they treat their own nationals." "a
Finally, article 220 provides for the negotiation of mutual
recognition by member states of companies resulting from the merger
of companies from different EEC member states.14 National legis-
lation is being amended accordingly.
The total effect is to facilitate greatly cooperation by corporate
parties with diverse citizenship in joint ventures within the member
countries of the EEC. Indeed, it can be expected that no serious
obstacle will impair the right of such a joint venture to establish itself
in the EEC in the near future.
II. THE JOINT VENTURE UNDER NATIONAL LAWS
With the right of joint establishment thus essentially guaranteed,
the national antitrust laws of the EEC members can be examined for
their applicability to the joint venture.
Section 1 of the West German Law Against Restraints of Com-
petition of July 27, 1957 states that: "[A]greements made by enter-
prises or associations of enterprises for a common purpose . . . are
invalid insofar as they are apt to influence, by restraints of competition,
the production or market conditions with respect to the trade in goods
or commercial services." 5 This provision, by its very language, is of
broad applicability, but it does not explicitly refer to any particular
form of business organization. In- a recent case, the court avoided
altogether the issue of the applicability of section 1 to the joint
venture, but stated that: "The joint exploitation of trade oppor-
tunities by joint means of a joint company formed for such purposes
does not contain monopolistic powers .... ," "6 The case has been
13298 U.N.T.S. at 87-88, 51 Am. J. INTIL L. at 931, CCH COMMON MARKET
REP. 116329.
14 298 U.N.T.S. at 87, 51 Aa!. J. INT'L L. at 930, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.
6327.
15 [1957] 1 Bundesgesetzblatt 1081 [hereinafter cited as CARTEL LAW], reprinted
in English in I EUROPEAN PRODUCTIVITY AGENCY OF THE ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC'ICES
(1960) [hereinafter cited as OEEC GUIDE]. See generally Schapiro, The German
Law Against Restraints of Comipetition-Comparative and International Aspects
(pts. 1-2), 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 201 (1962).
16 Decision of Appellate District Court, April 4, 1957 (Stdderklame II), in
WuW/E OLG 245 (4 WuW 281 (1959)).
A note on citations: WIRTSCHAFr UND WETTBEWERB [hereinafter cited as WuW]
is a journal which publishes European and EEC antitrust law materials. It also
publishes case reports of several tribunals in volumes entitled WuW ENTSCHEIDUNGS-
SAMMLUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT. These will be hereinafter cited as: WuW/E OLG
(Appellate District Court); WuW/E BKARTA (Federal Cartel Office).
The yearly reports of the Federal Cartel Office-BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELL-
AMTES TJBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IM JAHRE SOWIE i4BER LAGE UND ENTWICKLUNG AUF
SEINFm AUFGABENGEBIET-will be hereinafter cited as BKARTA REP,. preceded by the
applicable year.
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cited in support of the position that joint venture agreements do not
come within the purview of section 1 at all." The German Federal
Cartel Authority-The Bundeskartellamt (BKartA) -likewise did not
decide on the applicability of article 1 when the BKartA granted a
temporary exemption to a jointly owned fish fillet producing enter-
prise under section 5(2) which it labelled a rationalization cartel."8
While the claim of total nonapplicability of section 1 may be too broad,
what may be significant is the fact that the joint German venture.had
to notify the BKartA in order to apply for an exemption under the
German law.
Even more significant is the clear policy statement issued by the
BKartA suggesting a distinction between non-competitors, for which
article 1 should not apply, and competitors, for which a sort of rule
of reason should apply, but only, apparently, if the partners are not
capable of carrying out the commercial purpose alone. The BKartA
stated that:
A joint enterprise comprising similar participants is allowable
when the participants are not in the position to carry out the
purpose alone. Whether the joint enterprise will be likely,
first, to make possible a sharing of competition, or whether
its effect will consist in influencing the market conditions by
shrinking competition, can only be decided after consideration
of all the circumstances of any particular case."9 [But, on
the other hand:] Where enterprises having different busi-
ness branches form a joint enterprise for the purpose of
carrying out a construction or an industrial undertaking to-
gether, there is no violation of article 1 of the German Cartel
Law; the partners of the joint enterprise are not in com-
petition with respect to each other.20
Thus, a rule would appear to emerge that where the participants
are competitors which are not in the position to carry out the purpose
of the venture alone, their agreement, though not prohibited, would
require an exemption from the applicability of section 1. It appears
to leave the way clear to non-competitors and, in particular, to partners
whose business relationship is vertical.
The only other section of the German Cartel Law which may be
relevant to joint ventures is section 23. That provision requires that
corporate acquisitions and mergers in which twenty percent or more of
the market for any line of goods or commercial services will be brought
17 Rasch, Kartellvertrag oder Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, 1 WuW 79 (1961).
18 Kieler Fischgrosshandels Case, 1959 BKARTA REP. 26.
'9 1959 BKARTA REP. 17.
20 Ibid.
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under single control be reported to the BKartA. The specific transac-
tions covered are mergers, acquisitions of stock or assets, management
contracts, and any kind of acquisition in another enterprise by which the
acquiring company obtains twenty-five percent or more of the voting
capital of the other enterprise.21  However, the language of this section
lends itself to the construction that section 23 is applicable only to an
acquisition of the requisite equity interest in an already existing enter-
prise. Consonant with this interpretation, the formation of a new
joint venture is not an arrangement with "another enterprise."
Even if section 23 were given a broad construction to include the
formation of a joint venture which fulfills the market share requirement
by a partner owning at least twenty-five percent of the voting capital,
this section would not appear to impose a very serious burden on the
joint venture. Even though this section requires registration, only
eight enterprises reported consolidations on their own initiative, 22 thus
apparently largely ignoring the registration procedure. Perhaps this
is because under this clause the BKartA has inadequate power to follow
up registration with effective action. The BKartA cannot prohibit
the acquisition; at most, it can require the companies involved to
explain their position when there is a danger that a market-dominating
enterprise is likely to result.23 The BKartA has recognized its own
limitation in stressing that the Cartel Law is inadequate in counter-
acting the consolidation of economic power in Germany.24 If the lack
of enforcement here is at least a partial explanation for low registra-
tion figures, it may, therefore, provide a clue that the rate of registra-
tion may increase with effectiveness of enforcement.
Thus, the German Cartel Law presents no serious obstacle to the
establishment of joint ventures. Similarly, French antitrust legis-
lation 25 does not explicitly attempt to regulate the formation of joint
ventures. In fact, the most relevant provision exempts from the gen-
eral prohibition of practices hindering competition any concerted action,
convention, or combination whose effect is to extend the market for
its products or "ensure further economic progress by means of
rationalisation and specialisation." 26
21 CARTEL LAW § 23, 1 OEEC GUIDE D1.0, at 14.
221959 BKARTA REP. 46.
2 3 CARTEL LAW § 24, 1 QEEC GUIDE D1.0, at 14.
24 Guinther, Two and One-Half Years of German Antitrust Policy, in 1 INTR-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION, CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN
MODERN LAw [hereinafter cited as INT'L CONFERENCE] 95, 108 (1961). For an
analysis of mergers and comparative law on oligopoly, see Schwartz, Parallel Action
in Oligopoly Markets, in 2 id. at 433.
25 Article 59 bis Price Ord. No. 45-1483, June 30, 1945, as amended, 2 OEEC
GUIDE F1.0, at 2.
28 Article 59 ter, § 2, Price Ord. No. 45-1483, June 30, 1945, as amended, 2 QEEC
GUIDE F1.0, at 3.
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Likewise, the antitrust laws of the remaining member countries
of the EEC do not explicitly deal with joint ventures. Belgian law
is broadly directed against enterprises exercising a "preponderant in-
fluence on the market for goods or capital," whether alone or in
combination.27  The Netherland's Economic Competition Act au-
thorizes government ihtervention against an abuse of economic power
by one or a combination of enterprises with a dominant market posi-
tion.2" The Italian Draft Bill,29 while prohibiting dominant market
power achieved as a result of "understandings," specifies that mergers
of associations and concentration of shares are not "understandings"
within the meaning of the law."0 The Italian Bill, therefore, specifically
may be construed to exclude the agreement creating the joint venture
from its purview. In Luxembourg, in the absence of any special
national legislation regulating restrictive trade practices, the Treaty
of Rome is expected to be the law with respect to practices involving
community matters. In short, it is apparent that national legislation
of the EEC countries does not purport to regulate, at least expressly,
the creation of the joint venture.
III. THE JOINT VENTURE UNDER THE TREATY OF ROME
The antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Rome do not proscribe
any particular form of corporate structure. Article 85 outlaws all
agreements by enterprises, decisions by associations, and all concerted
practices which are apt to affect inter-Common Market commerce and
which have as their object, or result, inter alia, in the distortion of
competition within the Common Market. 1 Article 86 complements
85 by proscribing abuse of a dominant position by one or more enter-
prises.32 Concentration and merger, however, cannot be prevented;
only abusive exploitation of a dominant market position is prohibited
under this article.
33
27 Law on the Protection Against Abuse of Economic Power of June 22, 1960,
[1960] MONITEUR BELGE 4674, 5210. See generally Del Marmol & Fontaibe, Pro-
tection Against the Abuse of Economic Power in Belgium, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 922
(1961).
28 [1956] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 401; [1958] Nederlandse Staatscourant
Nos. 412-43, arts. 24-27.
29 [1960] Foro Jt. IV, 30--Testo definitivo del disegno di legge per la tutula
della liberta di concorrenza.
30 [1960] Foro Jt. IV, 30, art. 2.
31298 U.N.T.S. at 47, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. at 895, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.
2001.
32 298 U.N.T.S. at 48, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. at 896, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.
l2101.
3 3 Article 66, § 1 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC), April 18, 1951, provides, in contrast, a means of controlling the
method of creating concentrations. For a comparison of the provisions of the EEC
and ECSC Treaties, see Kronstein, The Significance of the Provisions Concerning
Competition Within the Total Perspective of the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty,
in 1 INT'L CONFERENCE 131.
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The absence of provisions in the Treaty of Rome expressly appli-
cable to particular business structures, such as joint ventures, is char-
acteristic of modern European restrictive trade practices legislation.
No specific form of business undertaking is, a priori, judged either
pernicious or harmless. Commercial enterprises are first allowed to
come into existence; then, irrespective of their form, they are prag-
matically evaluated and, if necessary, controlled in terms of their actual
behavior.
IV. THE AGREEMENTS ESTABLISHING THE VENTURE
A. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome
While there is no provision in the Treaty of Rome dealing with
the joint venture explicitly, the genesis of possible antitrust concern
may originate from the very basic organic documents creating the
joint enterprise.3 4 This serious problem arises because such documents
may be "agreements" within the meaning and purview of article 85.
Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits "all agreements between enterprises,
all decisions by associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices
which are apt to affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the Common Market." " Certain practices, includ-
ing price fixing; production, distribution, technical development or
investment controls; market or supply division; tie-in agreements, and
the imposition of different conditions for various transactions involv-
ing similar goods that adversely affect competitors of the favored
party, are expressly prohibited.3" Such agreements are stated to be
null and void by article 85, section 2. However, any agreement, de-
cision, or practice which:
contributes to the improvement of the production or distribu-
tion of commodities or to the promotion of technological or
economic progress, while reserving an equitable share of the
resulting profit to the consumers and which does not
(a) impose on the enterprises involved any restrictions not
indispensable for the attainment of these objectives, or
34 The joint venture in the Common Market may take one of two corporate
forms approximating the American corporation-the stock company and the limited
liability company. Both entities insulate the shareholders from liability for company
debts. One difference between the two is the suitability of their shares for trading.
This study is confined to these two corporate types, since the joint venture is generally
cast into either one of these two forms. See generally Conard, Supra note 3.
35 298 U.N.T.S. at 47, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. at 895, CCH CoMM N MARKET REP.
ff2001.
31 Ibid.
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(b) enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in re-
spect of a substantial portion of the commodities in-
volved . . .
[may be exempted from the prohibition of section 1].1.
But this exemption from the prohibition of article 85, section 1, can
only be invoked if the agreement or decision has been notified to the
EEC Commission which has exclusive jurisdiction for granting ex-
emptions38 For a ruling of nonapplicability of article 85, section 1,
there is limited overlapping jurisdiction; the parties may apply to the
EEC Commission or to a national court of the EEC countries.
Therefore, to the extent to which the basic organic document
creating the joint venture represents an agreement between the part-
ners coming within the purview of article 85, section 1, it becomes
vulnerable under section 2 of article 85.
B. Possible Sources of Anticompetitive Effects in the Organic
Docunents
The organic documents creating the joint venture will embody
contractual obligations between the partners which are designed to
fit best the particular circumstances involved in the establishment and
the proposed operations of the joint venture. There are quite a num-
ber of clauses which may be embodied in such agreements which may
give rise to problems under article 85.
A first possible source may be traced to the purpose clause in the
organic documents. Such a statement of a joint venture's purposes is
required by the national laws of the member countries of the EEC.
39
However, it would seem that unless the purpose clause is unduly re-
strictive, by expressly excluding the joint ventures from carrying out
specific economic activities or from engaging in business in specified
territorial areas, such clauses would, by themselves, make the pro-
hibition of article 85 inapplicable. Usually, the recital of purposes and
objects contemplated for the joint venture is broad enough to negate
any implications of restraints of trade.
3T Ibid.
38 Regulation 17, arts. 2, 5, [1962] J.O.C.E. 205, 206, as amended, [1962] J.O.C.E.
1656, CCH CoiMNox MARKET REP. 9112411, 2441. See Weiser, supra note 7, at 23-32,
for a discussion of the negative rulings and grant of exemptions, and an analysis of
the mandatorily registrable class and optionally registrable class of agreements.
39 The organic documents represent the basic agreement between the partners.
They are equivalent to American articles and by-laws. See, e.g., Germany, Gesetz
ilber Aktiengesellschaften, art. 20; Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrank-
ter Haftung GmbH, art. 5(4); Belgian Code de Commerce, -IX, art. 30(I), as
amended, Law of January 6, 1958. The statement of purpose is for the benefit of
creditors and incorporators.
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More serious problems may arise from other provisions in the
organic documents. Where the joint venture will be engaged in
manufacturing operations, the partners may agree on a plan for the
level of production of their venture. They may base this level on
market potential for the joint venture's products or on a partner's out-
put of primary or other material. The partners may provide for a
stated level of financial investment for certain commercial activities;
they may make definite allocations for stated objectives in manu-
facturing, marketing, development or research operations. Where the
organic documents explicitly prohibit exports from certain areas into
others, perhaps to protect one of the partner's areas of business, a divi-
sion of territories in the Common Market may occur. Such an export
embargo was present in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co.,40 in which the joint manufacturing subsidiaries were prohibited
from exporting to countries in which the partners manufactured inde-
pendently. Or, the partners may agree upon the pricing policy of the
products or services sold by the joint venture. Whenever such and
similar restraining clauses are explicit and go beyond the inherent
limitations imposed by the capital structure of the joint venture, they
would bring the prohibition of article 85, section 1 into play..
Similar difficulties may arise from the type of shares distributed
among the partners and the rights attendant thereto. The corporate
structure may approximate that described in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America.4 There, an international corporation was
formed abroad by American, German, Swiss, French, and English
aluminum producers. The production quota of aluminum of the
foreign corporation was limited to quantities proportional to the shares
held by the corporate partners in the new enterprise. Sales quotas
of excess production were relative to the share holdings, and the sale
of purified aluminum to the country of origin of the aluminum ore
was al'so indirectly proportional to the number of shares held by the
partners. In effect, the joint venture can thus become a constrained
corporate entity, encapsulated from the outset in the restraints em-
bodied in its shares.
In addition, other sections of the organic document may bring the
joint venture into conflict with article 85. For example, when one or
more of the partners contributes intangible property rights, such as
patents, trademarks, know-how, or services, rather than cash, in ex-
change for shares, the laws of certain of the Common Market coun-
tries require a detailed description of the capital structure in the
40 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
41 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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organic document.4 - The manner of transfer, and the nature and the
quantum of industrial property rights transferred to the joint venture
may introduce additional restraints on the competitive energies of the
enterprise. Moreover, such a grant of industrial property rights to
the joint venture may be by assignment or license, and may be subject
to restrictions intended to preserve the rights granted. The pro-
priety of the form of grant and any restraints attendant thereto may
bring article 85 into play whether these agreements involving indus-
trial property rights are embodied in the organic documents or; as is
generally the case, in ancillary agreements.
Thus, the number, character, and seriousness of possible re-
strictive provisions in the organic documents of joint ventures may
vary with the particular needs of the partners to protect their interests
with respect to each other, third parties, and the public.
But it soon becomes apparent that the basic organic documents
founding the joint venture in the Common Market may involve a
degree of vulnerability under article 85, if the required effect on
Common Market competition and interstate trade are found. What
would appear to be most objectionable in terms of the aims of the
Treaty of Rome is placing the joint venture into an economic strait
jacket from the time of its creation. Ideally, the venture should be
able to develop and take advantage of new economic opportunities of
the growing market. Where the organic documents, considered as a
whole, would allow the venture to expand in accordance with its own
economic capabilities, they should not be the subject of antitrust
suspicion.
It would appear to be no adequate answer to argue that the share-
holders always have the power to amend the articles in order to re-
move anticompetitive restrictions from the organic documents. The
mere existence of the agreement raises the antitrust issue. Also, any
proposed amendment is always subject to being blocked by the other
partner whenever he regards such a change as inimical to his interests.
Moreover, publication of the articles as required by the national
laws of the Common Market countries would appear to be an equally
inadequate solution. Theoretically, publication should make it possible
for the EEC Commission to scrutinize the proposed enterprise early
in its career. But many countries permit publication of only a sum-
mary of the articles,43 which may not include possibly offensive por-
tions. In any event, the Regulations pursuant to article 85, though
providing for notification and examination of agreements, do not
42 See, e.g., CHURCH, BusinEss AsSOCIATIONS UNDER FRENCH LAW (1960).
43 E.g., France. Loi du 24 Juillet 1867, art. 57. There are similar provisions in
the German law.
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suggest their own nonapplicability as a result of publication of the
organic documents of a joint venture.
C. Documents Supplementary to the Articles
Not all of the many provisions which are needed to define the
respective rights of the partners in a joint venture need be described in
its articles. Many important matters may be left to ancillary agree-
ments. Indeed, this may be a preferred management practice. The
control devices deemed necessary for the protection of minority in-
terests, the nature, rights, and distribution of shares, arrangements re-
specting industrial property rights, and the pattern of management of
the joint venture may often be the subject of such secondary docu-
inents. Such separate agreement may become effective at the time
when the joint venture comes into being and be essential to its op-
erational existence. - Many of the arrangements found in the organic
documents may rather occur here in the ancillary documents. And
to the extent that trade and competition are affected as specified in
article 85, such clauses may be subject to its prohibition.
D. The Situation Under the Regultions and the Bosch Decision
The resulting situation under the Treaty and the Regulations
is very unsatisfactory. To the extent to which agreements in the
organic and ancillary documents establishing the joint venture come
within the purview of article 85, section 1, in their effect on trade and
competition, they would be prohibited. Under section 2 of article 85,
such agreements would be null and void, and thus unenforceable. Ac-
cordingly, the very existence of a joint venture may be placed in
jeopardy by private parties,44 governmental agencies, a dissatisfied
partner, or competitors.
\Vhetlher the agreement which embodies the prohibited. anti-
competitive clause will be considered null and void in its entirety, and,
therefore totally unenforceable, or whether only that clau.c %Nill be
held invalid, should depend on how essential that clause is to the
entire agreement. Where that clause represents the essence of the
agreement, the agreement may fall in its entirety; otherwise, it may be
held valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the invalidity (if the par-
ticular clause. Moreover, problems of jurisdiction may further coni-
plicate the matter. The EEC administrative and judicial institutions
41 Private party suits attacking the validity of a corporation are recogni LkI in
(ernlany and France. E.g., CARTEL LAW §§25, 26, 35, 38, 1 OEEC Gvii' L.0,
at 15, 17-18. Franceschelli, Le Premier RqgInent d'Applicatio des .Articles 85 et
86 du TraitW de Rome, 50 REvuE uu IARcukE CtmMuN 345, 347 (1962), opintc, that
an action for damages between private parties will be entertained in Italy.
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only have jurisdiction respecting matters of Community interest. Ac-
cordingly, they would normally have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the clause embodying the anticompetitive effects. " But, the
question of the essentiallity of the clause and, hence, the validity of
the entire agreement would be passed upon by the appropriate national
institution. It is likely, therefore, that the question of the validity of
the agreement in the organic and the ancillary documents of the joint
venture would likely be decided, in part, by different forums.
The Regulations do not provide an adequate solution to these
problems. They subject agreements coming within the purview of
article 85, section 1, for which it is desired to claim an exemption under
article 85, section 3, to notification. For certain classes of agreements,
notification is optional.4 Hence, where the exception to notification
does not apply, the agreements entered into at the formation of the
joint venture become subject to notification to the EEC Commission.
The Bosch decision has somewhat attenuated this effect of the Regu-
lations by holding that, although article 85 has been in effect since the
date of the Treaty of Rome, section 2-the null and void clause-only
came into effect, with minor exceptions not applicable here, on March
13, 1962. It held, further, that agreements existing on that date,
which come within the purview of section 1 of article 85 and which
are outside of the exceptions from notifications of the Regulations,
are null and void unless timely notified pursuant to the Regulations."
Accordingly, under this holding, agreements which established
joint ventures prior to March 13, 1962 should be valid at least until
that date. For the period subsequent thereto and for agreements
which established joint ventures in the EEC after March 13, 1962,
the parties are confronted with the serious dilemma of notifying their
agreements within the time schedule or facing the possible adverse
consequences attendant to invalidity or penalties imposed by the Com-
45 The Treaty cannot give rise to private rights. The validity of agreements
which are not null and void according to the rules of the EEC is derived not from
any provisions of thc Treaty, but from the provisions of municipal law concerning
the freedom to contract. See Balladore Pallieri, 11 Mercato comnnuw enropeo e [a
legislazione italiana anthnonopolistica, 13 DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 407 (1959) ; Fran-
ceschelli, The Restrictions on Competition That Can Be Exempt From the Prohibition
of Article 85, sec. 1, in 1 Ixr'L CONFERENCE 297, 306. For a discussion of the relation-
ship between national and EEC law, see generally Clement, The Particular Problem
of Delimiting Competence To Act Between the Commission of the EEC and the
Individual National Cartel Authorities, in 1 id. at 395; Steindorf, The Provisions
Against Restraints of Competition. ,n the European Community Treaties and the
National Law, in 1 id. at 191.
46 See Weiser, supra note 7; Regulation 17, arts. 4, 5(2), [1962] J.O.C.E. 206,
CCH Co-.2o,N MARKET R.EP. fl1f 2431, 2441.
47Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbI,
Court of Justice of the European Communities, April 6, 1962, 8 Recueil de la Juris-
prudence de la Cour No. 13/61, [1962] J.O.C.R. 1081, CCH Co0MoN MARKET REP.
18003.
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mission if a violation of section 1 of article 85 or of the Regulations
were found.
To require the notification of agreements necessary to the forma-
tion of the joint venture is believed to be unsound. This result would
be tantamount to attempting to supervise the establishment of a com-
mercial enterprise ab initio. There is no basis in the history of the
Treaty bf Rome supporting the principle that competition can best be
nurtured and fostered by controlling the establishment or form of new
corporate enterprises from the outset. On the contrary, the Treaty
itself expressly recognizes the Right of Establishment 4 which seems
to guarantee the validity of corporate business forms-whether joint
or not-unfettered by any requirement of prior registration with an
administrative agency.
It would, therefore, appear highly commendable for the Council
of the EEC to clarify the status of such formative agreements. Some
of them would, undoubtedly, justify a ruling confirming that they do
not come within the purview of section 1 of article 85; others could
qualify for an exemption under section 3 of article 85; at a minimum,
others would warrant an exception from the notification provisions.
Such rulings could be made applicable for a certain limited period.
Also, such different rulings would recognize distinctions inherent in
such agreements, such as the number of partners, their respective
nationality, their respective competitive situation, and the nature of
the commercial activity of the joint venture. A legal justification for
giving such a favorable treatment to the agreements creating the
joint venture could be found in the establishment of the joint venture
itself. If one is willing to recognize that a joint venture is, ipso facto,
an economic entity which tends to make, from an overall point of view,
a contribution to the economic and technological progress of the EEC,
its creation would provide the basic legal and laudable purpose to
which such agreements are ancillary and hence, also be permissible
and valid. Subsequently, the economic effects of such agreements can
be evaluated during the operations of the joint venture along with its
other contracts for their effect on *competition in the EEC.
V. THE OPERATIONS OF THE VENTURE
After a joint venture has been established, its business opera-
tions can be expected to be subject to antitrust scrutiny essentially on
the same terms as other forms of corporate organization. These
operations may arise out of agreements between the joint venture and
48 Arts. 52-58, 298 U.N.T.S. at 37-40, 51 Am. J. INTL L. at 886-88, CCH CoM-
moN MARKET REP. 111 1301-81.
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another enterprise or the joint venture and one of the founding part-
ners, but only, in the latter case, to the extent to which the joint
venture then qualifies as an "enterprise" distinct from its parent.49
A first relevant factor in any such evaluation is the commercial
purpose pursuant to which the operation is carried outY° It would
always seem to be advantageous for a joint venture to promote the
aims of the Treaty of Rome, as stated in its Preamble and Principles.
Increasing incompatibility would make it more difficult to justify the
venture's existence. However, the Common Market is a dynamic,
evolving phenomenon; its aims may have varying importance at any
one time. What appears presently as a laudable economic objective
for purposes of one segment of the Common Market may, in the future,
be viewed as inimical to another sector. A more sophisticated exam-
ination of the compatibility of the purpose and practices of a joint
venture with the Treaty, therefore, should account for the future
economic growth of the Community.
The fact that a joint venture intends, as its business purpose, to
overcome difficulties in finding suitable outlets for its excess production
in the United States rather than to help Europe, does not mean, how-
ever, that the venture is incompatible with the philosophy of the EEC.
A recent case showed that the business reasons pertaining to conditions
outside of the Common Market were of secondary importance in
evaluating the propriety of the formation of a joint United States-
Belgian factory. The fact that the enterprise would alleviate labor
and economic difficulties within the Community 5 became a primary
business purpose on the basis of which Common Market officials could
justify the joint venture.
An operating joint venture is, by its very nature, more inclined
to certain types of business conduct than are other corporate enter-
prises. Fundamentally, two possible anticompetitive tendencies inhere
in jointness: the competitive vigor of the joint venture may be
hampered by one or more of its parents; and the joint venture itself
49 A very important concept under the EEC antitrust laws is that of the term
"enterprise." An agreement only comes within the scope of Article 85, section 1,
when it is between at least "two enterprises." This question will be quite complex in
the case of the joint venture. One question is whether the agreements between the
parent holding more than 50% equity interest in the joint venture and the joint venture
are agreements between two distinct enterprises. A different answer may obtain
respecting the agreements between a parent holding a minority interest in the joint
venture and the joint venture. Also, is the agreement between a joint venture, which
has, for example, two corporate parents, and another corporation, an agreement
between two enterprises or between more than two? On the definition of "enterprises,"
see Weiser, supra note 7, at 28-29. Behr, The Concept of Enterprise Under the
European Economic Community, 26 LAw & COXNTM,. PROc. 454, 462 (1961).
50 See BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 200 (1958).
i1 Written question no. 91 of M. Armengaud to the Commission of the EEC,
Case of Reniolds M-al Co. ond Soci~t G~nirale de Belgique, [1962] J.O.C.E 893.
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may exert an anticompetitive influence on the commercial activities of
the partners vis-a-vis each other.52  To illustrate the first tendency,
which will be the focus of the subsequent discussion, if the jointly
owned company will be a potential competitor of one or more of the
partners, its competitive ability might be curtailed by restricting its
markets, customers, or products to those not dealt with by the parent.
The joint venture might also be prevented from offering disruptive
prices of quality.53 When these practices affect inter-member trade
and intra-Common Market competition, they would come under the
prohibition of article 85.
A. Market Division or Customer Allocation
One of the basic aims of the Common Market is to abolish custom
and tariff barriers to trade, created by non-economic territorial bound-
aries. A division of the Common Market by joint venturers along
existing political lines, therefore, would be most objectionable. Such
restraints would defeat or neutralize the positive effects on free trade
fostered by the creation of the Market. The Commission of the EEC
is "convinced that in the first place, those infringements )f articles 85
and 86 should be taken up which threatened to undo the abolition of
barriers to trade within the Common Market." "
Division of the Common Market is more likely to occur when one
or more of the partners to a joint venture already operates in a mem-
ber state and when he is a potential or actual competitor of the joint
venture. Market division is probably least likely when there is no
actual or potential competition between the joint venturers, and, per-
haps, if one or more of the parents are located outside of the Common
Market. Also, exclusive allocation of the entire Common Market
territory to the joint venture is least likely to be objectionable under
EEC laws, especially if the partners intend to include other countries
as they are admitted to membership in the EEC.
B. Marketing and Production
Because joint distribution and marketing arrangements may re-
sult in territorial division, they have been carefully scrutinized by
antitrust agencies in the Common Market and particularly in Germany.
The experience of the BKartA under German law may, therefore, shed
some light on the legality of such arrangements under the Treaty of
52 See BREaWsTER, op. cit. supra note 50, at 202.
03 Ibid.
5Von der Groeben, The Cartel Legislation of the European Economic Coin-
munity in the Light of Two Years Experience, in 1 INAL CONFERENCE 63, 67.
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Rome." After balancing advantages and disadvantages, the BKartA
held that certain joint distributing and marketing ventures were per-
missible because they promoted economic progress. The arrangements
under consideration were substantially free of unnecessary restraints
and negative restrictions on exports. In addition, the ventures intro-
duced a new element-a contribution was being offered by the joint
venture that had not previously been made available by the parents.
This contribution varied from case to case-a new variety of product,
a faster service, a more dependable supply-but in each instance it was
not merely a duplication of the old. It was not necessary for these
new features, however, to be predicated on or protected by patents,
trademarks, and the like. Moreover, the arrangements generally in-
volved an aspect of specialization; the partners thereby eliminated some
inefficient feature of their own organization. 5'
Statements of the EEC Commission tentatively suggest that
similar criteria may be used in applying the antitrust laws to joint
ventures engaged in marketing or distribution. The Commission has
reported favorably on "coordinating the manufacturing progranme of
several enterprises so that each enterprise limits the range of articles
produced." 57 It has further stated that:
One of the chief effects of the Common Market will be
to stimulate production and trade within the Community,
each of the six countries being encouraged to specialize in
the fields in which it enjoys comparative advantages ....
There is accordingly reason to believe that each member
country will be led to develop certain specialties within each
of the branches of its industrial production and to drop others
without abandoning any of the major sectors which form
an established part of its industry.58
Accordingly, the presence of the discussed features should be looked
upon favorably by the EEC.
C. Price Fixing
Two possible sources of restrictive practices may be found. The
first involves the price which the joint venture charges its share-
55 See generally Decision of Federal Cartel Office, Aug. 23, 1960 ("Terrazzo"),
in WuW/E BKARTA 241 (11 WuW 805 (1960)). This case raised typical issues
that arise under article 85.
56 For a discussion of the standards which the BKartA applies in granting an
exemption from the prohibition, see 1958 BKARTA REP. 46-47.
57 COM.I%ISSION, OF THE EEC, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE COM NUNITY § 71, at 85 (1961).
58 Id. § 71, at 85-86.
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holders who purchase its product in amounts exceeding their quota
as measured by their contribution to the joint venture's capital.59
These sales most often occur if the parent does not itself make the
item which the joint venture produces. If, because of quality or other
factors, the joint venture's product is more attractive to the parent
than equivalent items obtainable from other Common Market sources
of supply, there would be little need to justify the pricing policy.
Where, however, the venture's product is less attractive than com-
petitive products available from other Common Market sources, the
pricing policy may be questionable.
A second source of possible restrictive effects may involve the
price charged for the product to outsiders. This problem is peculiar
to the joint venture only to the extent to which it occurs pursuant to
an agreement between the parents determining that price. But in that
respect, it is but one aspect of the issue of agreements between the joint
partners relating to the management of the joint venture.
D. Management of the Joint Venture
The competitive initiative of a joint venture may be dulled if the
partners directly control its governing boards. As directors, they may
restrict output, production, research, product development, sales, ex-
pansion, and many other phases of business activity. Some of these
restraints may be inchoate in the. organic documents of the joint
venture; to that extent, they have been considered above. To the
extent that they are not so included, however, they may be viewed as
agreements, decisions, or concerted practices within article 85.
The magnitude of this anticompetitive factor would seem to be
a function of both the independence of the governing board from its
parents, and the competitive relationship of the joint venture to its
parents. The greater the board's independence, the less likelihood
there is of concern. On the other hand, the less competition there is
between the venture and its corporate shareholders, the more should
management of the joint venture be independent. This would suggest
that partners who do not compete with the joint venture, therefore, can
more actively contribute to the venture's management than can those
partners who compete with it. This also suggests that the director
of the parent company who is selected on the basis of his past pro-
ficiency for management in a field in which the parent company and
the joint venture compete, may need additional insulation from the
parent. Arrangements can be worked out in the corporate structure
v) See BR~wsmR, op. cit. supra note 50, at 204.
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of the joint venture for the most suitable insulation of such a corporate
executive.
E. The Role of Industrial Property
Industrial property rights, as represented by patents, trademarks,
and know-how, are likely to play a very significant role in the forma-
tion and management of a joint venture. If soundly managed, these
rights can be a most valuable asset of the new corporate enterprise.
In the evaluation of a joint venture under the policies of the
Treaty of Rome, the ownership of protected industrial property im-
mediately should cast the venture in a favorable light. It evidences
a likelihood of valuable contribution to science and technology by way
of a new and useful product, apparatus, or method of production. In-
dustrial property rights are well-recognized in the Common Market '
and will be given even stronger protection when the European Patent
Convention comes into effect, creating a single patent covering the
whole of the EEC. 1
To protect industrial property rights, certain restraints are com-
monly attached to their management and exploitation. Reasonable
restrictions that do not exceed the legitimate area of monopoly usually
are not objectionable under national antitrust laws.' Moreover, it is
significant that the Regulations have recognized the permissibility of
some form of restraints by excepting from notification
agreements between two enterprises, having as their sole
effect to impose on the purchaser or the user of industrial
property rights-particularly patents, utility models, designs
or trademarks-or on the beneficiary of contracts involving
the acquisition or use of manufacturing processes or knowl-
edge relating to the utilization and the application of indus-
trial techniques, limitations in the exercise of these rights.'
60 Ladas, Industrial Property, in 1 AM.ERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN CO.-
MON MfARKET-A LEGAL PROFILE 235 (Stein & Nicholson ed. 1960). For the inter-
national antitrust problems, see Timberg, International Patent and Trademark Li-
censes and Interchanges: The United States Approach, in 2 INT'L CONFEREN CE 751.
61 See Weiser & Behrman, The Convention for European Industrial Property
Rights, 5 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & Enuc. 233, 241, 243 (1961);
Froschmaier, Patents, Trade Marks, and Licenses Within the ComImunity, INT'L &
ComP. L.Q. 50 (Supp. No. 4, 1962).
62 Under German Law, restrictions imposed by the licensor are valid if within the
scope of the patent privilege. CARTEL LAW § 20, 1 OEEC GUIDE D1.0, at 12. De-
cisions of Federal Cartel Office, May 6, 1960, in WuW/E BKARTA 251 (11 WuW
815 (1960)); June 20, 1960, in WuWV/E BKARTA 254 (11 WuW 818, 1960));
Fourth Quarter 1960 ("Betriebsgeheimnis"). in WuW/E BKARTA 317 (3 WuW
217 (1961)). See also Decision of Federal Cartel Office, Feb. 19, 1959 ("Gewinds-
schneidemaschinen"), in WuW/E BKARTA 25 (4 WuW 305 (1959)).
6- Regulation 17, art. 4(2) (ii) (b), [1962] j O.C.E. 206, CCH COMMON MARKET
REP. f 2431.
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The Court of Justice has given further recognition to the value
of industrial property rights by stating that agreements which are
excepted from notification by the Regulations are valid. This is in
contrast to its statement that agreements that are not so excepted are
invalid unless timely notified with the Commission." Also, Com-
mon Market industries have recognized, and the Commission has
noted with apparent approval, the "revival of interest in a development
of foreign patent rights which can be profitable on the larger market
though they would not have been profitable on the separate national
markets." '
VI. PRESENT TRENDS IN THE EEC
The Community's business pattern over the past four years con-
firms the conclusion that the joint venture is currently a favorite form
of commercial undertaking, particularly suited to meet the challenge
of increased competition in the EEC. Business circles have responded
to the reduction of custom barriers, abolition of quotas, and increased
market demand and competition by expanding interstate business co-
operation. The reports of the EEC Commission and business journals
disclose very substantial activity during the last year in the acquisiti6n
of financial interests in other companies and in the formation of joint
ventures.66 Increased economic cooperation is found in manufacturing,
purchasing, and distribution.
The EEC Commission has recognized that much of the current
reorganization of industrial structures-including joint ventures-is
consonant both with the objectives of the Treaty and the need for
adaptation to a new and enlarged economic area. 7 This appreciation
64 Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH,
Court of Justice of the European Communities, April 6, 1962, 8 Recueil de la Juris-
prudence de la Cour No. 13/61, [1962] J.O.C.E. 1081, CCH CoMMoN MARKET REP.
ff 8003. The statement of the court in reference to exempt agreements should be
taken cautiously. It is dictum in that such an agreement was not before the court.
The export prohibition of the Bosch case is not within the class of agreements exempt
from notification. But the court did pass upon the Regulation, as a whole. There-
fore, the statement should be given due consideration.
6 5 CoMIsssION OF THE EEC, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTivrTEs oF THE
COMMUNITY § 181, at 132 (1960).
66 See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1962, p. 1, col. 6. This trend was
accentuated by "reciprocal holdings among the companies concerned (with development
of technical cooperation) or . . . the joint founding of new enterprises .... "
COMMIssION OF THE EEC, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTnmrEs OF THE
COMMUNITY § 72, at 88 (1961). "[An important form] of cooperation is enlargement
of the size and financial basis of enterprises or takeover; [and] . . Penetration of
the domestic markets of the partner countries by the creation of local subsidiaries
and selling agencies or by agreements between firms for the reciprocal use of internal
distribution networks." Id. §§70(b), (d), at 85.
67 Id. § 71, at 85.
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of the economic contribution of joint ventures should facilitate the
issuance of Commission rulings permitting their establishment to con-
tinue unfettered by notification requirements of the antitrust laws.
It is significant that joint ventures will not be barred on the basis
of the participation of a non-Market partner. Financial aid will even
be extended from Community sources. Reynolds Metal Co. & Socit6
G~nerale de Belgique,"s a joint venture including an American partner,
and organized to build an aluminum rolling mill, received financial
help from Belgium and the European Investment Bank. On the
question of the participation by an American partner, the Commission
stated:
No Treaty provision permits the Commission to oppose in-
vestments into the Common Market by enterprises from out-
side the Common Market. . . . It appears difficult to make
a distinction between non-member parties on the basis of the
investor's intent to help Europe or not. . . .
It also overruled the contention that the six member countries were
self-sufficient in the field of aluminum manufacturing and "that the
financial help was going to affect the normal competition condi-
tions." " However, approval of the joint venture was only given with
the proviso that its operations be compatible with the rules of com-
petition of the Community.
VII. SUMMARY
This study suggests that the joint venture offers a suitable cor-
porate organization for doing business in the EEC. However, serious,
but not insurmountable, obstacles must be faced. Some aspects of
the establishment of the joint venture--such as some of the agreements
necessary for its creation-will be subject to the control of adminis-
trative agencies, if their validity is to be insured. In the management
of the joint venture, compatibility with the laws will be favored by
independence of its management and by emphasis on specialization
aspects. Practices which approximate traditional political barriers will
increase antitrust risks. Industrial property assets, like patents, trade-
marks, and know-how will represent a very valuable asset for the joint
venture. If skillfully and judiciously managed, the joint venture
should provide a sound manner of doing business in the EEC.
68 [1962] J.O.C.E. 893.
O Id. at 894.
70 Ibid.
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VIII. THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS UPON JOINT
VENTURES ABROAD
American antitrust law, and particularly the law of joint ventures,
is of great interest to Common Market administrative agencies in
whom is vested the authority to enforce the rules governing freedom
of competition. 71  Of course, it is of vital concern to American par-
ticipants in an EEC joint venture, who are likely to be confronted with
antitrust laws on both sides of the Atlantic. The American partner
may be subject principally to the Sherman Act, particularly if he con-
trols less than fifty percent of the venture's voting stock and cannot,
therefore, claim that it is a subsidiary.72
The law in this field is far from clear, but absent a purpose or
effect to restrain trade or to monopolize, "there is nothing per se un-
lawful in the association or combination of a single American enter-
prise with a single foreign concern in a jointly owned manufacturing
or commercial company to develop a foreign local market." " On the
other hand, "the fact that there is common ownership or control of the
contracting corporations does not liberate them [the partners] from
the impact of the antitrust laws." 7' In addition, a joint ,enture may
become unlawful if it unreasonably, directly, and substantially re-
strains the trade and commerce of the United States.
A great uncertainty, however, still enshrouds the validity of
American participation with actual, or potential competitors in joint
ventures abroad which may have restrictive effects.75  Our adminis-
trative and judicial decisions generally have not passed upon the
71 Nearly every issue of WuW comments on American antitrust decisions and
rulings. The same is true of Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Auslands
Intervatimaler Tell.
72 in United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 40 (S.D.
N.Y. 1961), appeal pending, 368 U.S. 964 (1962), Judge Murphy pointed out that if
Pan American had been a majority stockholder in Panagra, it might have made a
decisive difference in the final holding. Support for this position can be found in
AT'vY GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRusT REP. 90 (1955), in which it was stated that"where minority foreign stockholders are not competitors, but mere investors, a
foreign corporation may still be deemed a subsidiary of its American parent." Id.
at 90. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 69849 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), the consent decree defined a subsidiary as a corporation more than 50% of
whose stock entitled to vote for the election of directors was owned or directly
controlled by the defendant. See also United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemoirs
& Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 219 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
73 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). See also Van Cise, United States Antitrust Law, in FEDERAL BAR Ass'N,
INSTITUTE ON LEGAL AsPEcTs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 140, 152-54 (1960);
A-'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 90 (1955); BREwsaER, op. cit. supra
note 50.
74 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
75 See Haight, The Sherman Act, Foreign Operations, aced International Law,
in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENTS 89, 92-96 (World
Community Ass'n of Yale Law School 1962).
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legality of individual restrictive practices. Rather, American antitrust
cases usually have involved a complex of objectionable practices." In
addition, American antitrust defendants have often occupied a dom-
inant market position. In contrast, joint ventures in the Common
Market which include American participants often bring into question
the propriety of only a few practices, sometimes just one or two. Also,
the American participant often does not occupy a dominant position
in the market. Rather, it may be expected that, to an increasing ex-
tent, the joint venture in the EEC will involve a small or medium-size
American enterprise which cannot satisfactorily take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the Common Market without a European
partner. This may be particularly true when the American partner's
contribution to the joint venture is in new fields of technology within
his special competence.
A. The American Cases
Three recent American decisions may help to dispel some of the
uncertainty in this field. In United States v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc.,77 the district court sustained the validity of Pan American-Grace
Airways, Inc. (Panagra), a foreign joint venture in which Pan
American and Grace jointly owned fifty percent of the stock. Implicit
in the decision is the confirmation by the court that the original com-
bination was lawful. The court held that the "joinder of Grace and
Pan American was not the result of conspiracy, but was a lawful
combination with legitimate ends." 78 But the holding expressly dis-
tinguished between joint ventures and combinations of existing com-
petitive enterprises, which might be unlawful under the circumstances.
"It is apparent that the principle upon which these cases [cited by the
Government] were decided applied to combinations of existing com-
panies which were in substantial competition with one another prior
to their combinations." 79
The agreement forming Panagra prohibited the partners from
paralleling its services in South America and precluded competition in
that area. On that point, the court stated that "the division of terri-
tories understanding under which the operations of the two airlines
were conducted was not unreasonable under the circumstances and not
,) so
a per se violation . . ..
76 See, e.g., ArT'y GEN. NAT'L Cou. ANTITRUST REP. 62-90 (1955).
77 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal pending, 368 U.S. 964 (1962).
78 Id. at 22.
79Id. at 48.
80 Id. at 22.
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An important factor in favor of the joint ventures was that their
combination involved a novel feature. The joinder was to foster the
"development of a new form of transportation"; their action con-
stituted "the successful inauguration of an international air trans-
portation system in South America . . . in the truest sense a pioneer-
ing enzdeavor." s It is significant that both the joint venture itself and
its operations were found lawful. It was Pan American that was
found to have violated the Sherman Act by preventing the extension
of Panagra to the United States.
In two recent consent decrees which throw additional light on
these points, Standard Oil of New Jersey 2 and Gulf Oil " were
enjoined from engaging in joint marketing ventures with their partner,
Socony Mobil Oil Co. An important distinction, however, was drawn
between joint marketing and other cooperative operations. The
decrees directed the defendants to compete with each other, insofar as
practicable, in marketing petroleum products in the area formerly
served by their joint venture.8 4 But it is significant that joint pro-
duction, refining, and pipeline operation were excluded from a long list
of prohibitions against price fixing, allocation and divi,-ion of terri-
tories, markets, and customers, restrictions on imports and exports,
allocations of and limitations on production, and exclusion of dis-
tributors and third persons.8 5
It would be important to determine if there are differences in the
application of the antitrust laws to; different phases of the economy.
Business arrangements which involve joint production or joint manu-
facturing are likely to be more permanent in nature than joint systems
of distribution and marketing. Accordingly, restraints on competi-
tion that may occur in connection with the former arrangements may
be the more objectionable of the two types since they may hamper the
very source of industrial development. This may be particularly true
in an economy bent on economic growth, like that of the Common
Market. On the other hand, the first barriers to commerce that are
being removed in the EEC are tariffs and customs. These were
81 Id. at 27. (Emphasis added.)
82 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(consent decree) [hereinafter cited as Standard Decree].
83United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69851 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(consent decree) [hereinafter cited as Gulf Decree].
84 Standard Decree §VII(A), at 77341; Gulf Decree § IV, at 77348.
85 Standard Decree § V(E), at 77340; Gulf Decree § V(E), at 77349.
A further exception was made for the marketing operations of Esso Standard
Socit Anonyme Frangaise and its subsidiary in the Common Market. Standard
Decree § VII(H), at 77342; Gulf Decree § VII(F), at 77351. The cases are totally
silent as to the exact relationship between Esso Frangaise and the two defendants.
If, however, Esso Franqaise was the third partner in another joint marketing venture,
it may have for some reason provided insulation from the injunctive decree.
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traditional restraints on distribution systems.8 6 As a matter of achiev-
ing primary objectives first, the initial brunt of the antitrust laws may
be felt, therefore, by enterprises engaged in distribution and marketing.
The German cases seem to bear-this out. But, otherwise, a trend
that distinguishes production from distribution is not yet perceptible
in the EEC. In that light, the distinctions made between these two
phases of business in the two American consent decrees are note-
worthy. It will be important to watch for developments on both sides
of the Atlantic to determine if these cases-the German cases on one
hand, and the American on the other-reflect the inception of opposite
trends in antitrust application.
B. Possible Integration of United States and EEC Antitrust Policy
A recognition and an understanding of the antitrust laws of the
Common Market are a condition precedent to any changes in the
application of our own antitrust laws to American foreign trade in
general, and to American participants in EEC joint ventures in par-
ticular, either by legislative action or administrative and judicial de-
cision. The United States Department of Justice has taken a step
in this direction by recognizing that
throughout the Free World . . . restrictive business prac-
tices, or restraint of trade and monopolization as we would
call them, are inconsistent with competition, economic de-
velopment and technological progress in a free enterprise
society. Although enforcement activity in many countries
has been rather indifferent, by our standards, the interest in
an effort to prevent restrictive business practices has been
increasing greatly in recent years in western Europe. There
is reason to hope that the Common Market and the CECD
will aid and accelerate this development.8 7
The Department has also referred to the Treaty of Rome as "one of
the most significant developments in this field of law." 88 On the
other hand, the Federal Trade Commission has called for an evaluation
of joint ventures which are the "offspring of two or more giant cor-
porations, each with vast financial resources, which-for one reason or
another-want to conduct jointly through an enterprise in a field in
86 See generally Del Marmol, Distribution Methods in Restraint of Competition
Used by Market Dominating Enterprises, in 2 INT'L CONFERENCE 475.
87 Address by Lee Loevinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to the New York Bar Ass'n, January 25, 1962. See ATTz'y GEN. NAT'L
Co. q.i ANTITRUST REP. 92 (1955), for the relation of antitrust law to United States
programs abroad.
88 Ibid.
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which they have a common interest." " A study has also been pro-
posed of joint ventures which engage in activities overlapping those
of their parents and of those joint enterprises which are often used to
exploit new technologies in fields in which the partners have only
peripheral interests.
With respect to foreign joint ventures, it is being seriously ques-
tioned whether their impact on competition can be confined to foreign
countries; that "the togetherness of joint ventures has rigidly defined
boundaries; that corporations may stand as one in foreign countries or
markets, but that within the territorial confines of the United States,
they are vigorous rivals in the competitive struggle." " It is probably
significant that these remarks appear directed not so much to the
joint venture itself, but to bigness, attained by two enterprises, each
of which already has a sizeable share of the market for a commodity,
which use the joint venture as a device to pool their business. The
joint venture is then viewed as "the old trust technique in modem
dress."
Under this view, then, joint ventures "amongst companies whose
share of the market is too small to make any real impact upon the
competitive conditions in the industry" 9' should present no serious
antitrust problems. The risks should be further minimized if only
one, rather than a plurality of the partners, is American.
The Common Market now has antitrust laws which it is pledged
to effectuate 2  It is therefore advocated that duplication and conflict
between United States and EEC law should be prevented. 3  Repeal
89 Address by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Detroit,
Mich., March 12, 1962.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 See Address by Professor Dr. Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission,
Georgetown University, Washington D.C., April 12, 1960, in which he stated:
The new antitrust Regulations are of essential importance, considering that
the Treaty of Rome is founded on the principle that the course of economic
events is best guided by competition. Thus, emphasis in our antitrust philoso-
phy lies in the abolition of those types of cartel whose effects most resemble
those of customs duties and quotas, or those that impede the operation of a
Common Market. This means international cartels for the fixing of prices
or the division of markets, as well as export and import cartels affecting
trade between the member states.
The antitrust provisions of the EEC apply to restraints caused in the United States
but affecting the Common Market. See Hug, The Applicability of the Provisions of
the European Community Treaties Against Restraints of Competition to Restraints
of Competition Caused in Non-Membcr States But Affecting the Common Market,
in 2 INT'L CoNFRENcE 639.
93 See Address by Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General, New York, May
16, 1962; Dewey, Antitrust Barriers to Foreign Policy Goals, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 21
(1961). A special committee on antitrust laws of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York has suggested a clearance procedure by which exceptions to the
antitrust laws could be granted in certain situations.
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of the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act is again being urged. 4
Abroad, similar arguments are being made against the exemption for
export cartels under the German Competition Law. 5
Any reconciliation between American and EEC antitrust law,
however, is fraught with difficulties and challenges. Notwithstand-
ing many analogies, the laws are different. Enforcement of EEC
antitrust law is preceded by a registration procedure which is often
followed by negotiations to remove objectionable clauses. The ad-
ministrative proceeding can then be reviewed by the Court of Justice.
97
There is no precise counterpart in American law for this pattern of
registration and administrative procedure. Moreover, while some
trade practices are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EEC, many
related phases of business conduct are subject to the diverse laws of
the member states.
It will, however, be most unfortunate if the two sets of law act
at cross purposes. The exact areas of conflict may become gradually
more clearly discernible with the development of the EEC antitrust
laws. To the extent that a party may find it difficult, if not impossible,
to comply with one set of laws without measurably increasing his risk
of infringing the other, appropriate action should be taken promptly
to remove such inconsistencies.
The application of American antitrust laws to our foreign op-
erations calls for a keen understanding of the foreign legal-questions
and their relationship to the economic and political trends that shape
their background. Furthermore, our antitrust laws should not stifle
efforts to implement a freer foreign trade policy. There is an urgent
need for more effective coordination of our trade policies, especially as
they relate to the EEC. In contrast to the rest of the world, the
dynamic changes in the EEC demand a more concentrated and
specialized attention on the part of the United States. A sig-
94 See BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 454-56 (1958);
Foreign Law Can Change U.S. Business-Antitrust Climate Transformed by Common
Market, Nation's Business, Aug. 1962, pp. 42-50.
95 See Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition-Com-
parative and International Aspects (pts. 1-2), 62 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 201, 254 (1962).
96 Restraints on competition influence international economic relations adversely.
See Gunther, The Problems Involved in Regulating International Restraints of Com-
petition by Means of Public International Law, in 2 INT'L CONFERENCE 579.
97 Regulation 17, art. 17, [1962] J.O.C.E. 210, CCH Co.moN MARKET REP.
2561. See also LaGrange, Judicial Review of Decisions of Cartel Authorities, in
2 INT'L CONFERENCE 909.
92 See Kravis, Common Market-Lesson in Trade Expansion, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
March-April 1962, p. 6, for a program based on an unequivocal commitment to a
national policy of freer trade to compete without trade barriers without inevitable
injury. For an economic analysis of the relationship between the EEC and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the position of the United States, see
ALLEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT (1960).
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nificant step in this direction may be achieved by the establishment of
an advisory board on EEC matters. Such a board would be composed
of representatives of government, business, and academic circles. The
board should develop flexible and effective procedures for consultations
with concerned parties. It would proceed with the study of actual
cases of foreign business operations where serious conflicts between
antitrust and trade provisions arise. The board would also be con-
cerned with studying the developments in the EEC as they affect
American business interests, detecting and minimizing the areas where
our American laws work at cross purposes, and finally, with making
recommendations to promote measures consistent with the overall
national foreign trade policy of the United States.
IX. CONCLUSION
The joint venture in the EEC with American participation is a
shining and dynamic example of a business partnership reaching across
political frontiers. It is one of many developments of a broad magni-
tude that are unfolding on the international business scene. The Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 9 is a significant move toward the goal of
an Atlantic partnership. These changes are creating new and chal-
lenging responsibilities. The responsiveness and maturity with which
these challenges will be managed can be a decisive influence on how
successfully the economic and the political aims of the United States
will be attained.
99 76 Stat 872, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1991 (Supp. 1962). Also to be considered
in conjunction with such foreign problems is the Revenue Act of 1962, §§ 5, 7, 9,
12, 14-16, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 78, 535, 545, 643, 665-66, 668-69, 861, 901-02,
951-64, 970-72, 1246-49, 6048, 6677.
